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‘Acting is inevitable as soon as we walk out of our front doors and into society.’ 
So wrote Arthur Miller in his essay On Politics and the Art of Acting (Viking, 
2001). ‘We are ruled more by the arts of performance – by acting, in other words 
– than anybody wants to think about for very long.’ 
 
Aware that the ‘leader as performer’ has been around since antiquity, Miller was 
nevertheless convinced that the rise of television had recently transformed the 
situation. Watching the US presidential election of 2000, with its ‘relentless daily 
diet of crafted, acted emotions and canned ideas’, he sensed a deterioration in 
‘our democratic ways’ that raised doubts about ‘our claim to the right to instruct 
lesser countries on how to conduct fair elections’. 
 
Though since exploited by Bush and Blair over Iraq, this glassy convergence was 
pioneered by the actor-president Ronald Reagan. According to Miller, ‘the 
Gipper’ was unrivalled in his ability to confuse events in films with things that had 
actually happened: a habit that represented a ‘Stanislavskian triumph, the very 
consummation of the actor’s ability to incorporate reality into the fantasy of his 
role’. Reagan gave us ‘the leader as leading man’, hauling policies, including the 
Strategic Defense Initiative (‘Star Wars’), out of the drive-in at the back of his 
mind. As for the print journalists who might have insisted on distinguishing 
between fact and artfully presented fiction, Miller reckoned that ‘the American 
press is made up of disguised theatre critics; substance counts for next to 
nothing compared with style and inventive characterisation.’ 
 
Acting may have become a requirement of high political office in the television 
age, but not before other fixtures had also been pulled out of the modern theatre. 
As I’ve argued elsewhere, the ‘iron curtain’ started out as a reassuring but largely 
useless anti-fire device, suspended between stage and auditorium in the 18th 
century theatre. It was only after late Victorian engineers had turned it into a truly 
effective barrier that it was enlisted as a political metaphor, used first to refer to 
the stand-off between Britain and Germany in 1914, and six years later to 
describe the blockade between Bolshevik Russia and the encircling Allies. To the 
anti-war campaigners who used the term, the descent of the iron curtain marked 
an abrupt cancellation of informed exchange between citizens, who were 
consequently all the more easily enthralled by their warring governments. In this 
respect, it had the effect of doubling rather than finishing off the show. 
 
Metaphors weren’t the only thing that the politics of early 20th-century Europe 
took from the playhouse. The use of theatrical designers and scene-shifters to 
devise real-world special effects had a precedent in the 1780s, when Prince 
Grigori Potemkin was charged with improving conditions in the Ukraine and other 
southern territories recently annexed to Catherine the Great’s Russian empire. 
Instead of implementing genuine improvements, the story goes, Potemkin found 
it easier to have fake settlements rigged up with pasteboard flats, and then to 
guide the unknowing Catherine past them on her tours of inspection. When she 
and her retinue had gone, the painted façades of these ‘Potemkin villages’ were 
said to have been hastily dismantled and carted over the hill to be re-erected in a 
new location so that the empress could admire them all over again. 
 
Potemkin’s showmanship reached its climax in 1787, when Catherine II 
undertook a grandiose imperial cruise along the Dnepr river, travelling from Kiev 
to Kherson on the Black Sea in the company of various European ambassadors 
and potentates. The party travelled in eighty boats, seven of which are said to 
have been full-sized replicas of Roman galleys, and Potemkin ensured that every 
imaginable luxury was laid on during the six-week journey. Determined to 
convince Catherine and her visitors that he had successfully brought civilisation 
to the primitive steppe, he ordered the towns and villages along the route to be 
decorated, cleared of unsightly cripples and beggars, filled with welcoming 
crowds. It was in reports of this extravagant cruise that the story of the ‘Potemkin 
villages’ arrived in France, Germany and Britain. 
 
Many historians have subsequently insisted that the stories of full-scale scene-
rigging are false, and that Potemkin was actually only showing the best side of 
reality – in a manner that remains customary with royal visits. But the myth of 
Potemkin’s showmanship lingered into the nineteenth century, partly because it 
expressed a potential for confusion that genuinely existed when people from 
landowning circles in St Petersburg visited the remote and largely roadless 
Russian countryside. 
 
In the early 20th century, however, the legend of Potemkin’s pasteboard villages 
would be attached to new realities. Theatre designers joined artists in the 
camouflage effort of the First World War, reshaping the battlefield to compensate 
for the fact that, thanks to aerial photography, traditional hiding places no longer 
existed. Accusations of Potemkinism flourished, too, in the widening division 
between communism and capitalism. 
 
 To begin with it was little more than a hostile allegation used by the anti-
Bolshevik press to pre-empt the enthusiastic reports of the first Western 
socialists to visit Soviet Russia. In 1920 there was still comparatively little to 
discredit, although members of the first British Labour delegation were shown a 
number of futurist projects designed to indicate what socialism might bring to a 
Russia that anybody could see was starving, and wrecked by years of civil war 
and the Allied blockade. As the 1920s advanced, the tours became more 
organised, and by the time of the Bolsheviks’ tenth anniversary celebrations in 
1927, the carefully prepared itineraries featured special hotels and restaurants, 
and the range of model exhibits had been expanded to include shops stuffed with 
products, factories, agricultural exhibitions, clinics, schools and prisons. 
 
As Stalin consolidated his regime in the early 1930s, theatrical manipulations 
were being used systematically and in conjunction with measures intended to 
control foreign correspondents in Moscow. Soviet showmanship was also 
assisted by the psychological scene-shifting that zealous Western pilgrims would 
carry out in their own heads. 
 
Wafted around Ukraine in 1933, Edouard Herriot, the French former prime 
minister and mayor of Lyon, was taken through areas that had suffered 
catastrophic famine under Stalin’s collectivisation of agriculture. Indulged and 
gulled into praising the harvest, he even followed his minders in suggesting that 
people in the stricken area complained of food shortages only because 
conditions had been so thoroughly improved that popular expectations had risen 
to unprecedented levels. D.N. Pritt, a British barrister, anti-Fascist and Labour 
MP, was among the apologists who visited Stalin’s Russia to commend the show 
trials as better than anything available in a capitalist court. In 1944, Henry 
Wallace, America’s socialist vice-president, famously managed to tour the gulag 
together with his academic adviser, Owen Lattimore, without either of them 
realizing that they were actually in a vast prison. 
 
Comparable techniques were also used by the Nazis, notably at Terezin, a 
fortress and town in the Czech Republic in which Jews were imprisoned before 
transportation to Auschwitz. In the summer of 1944, the town was cleaned, 
painted and equipped with fake shops, and the population reduced by strategic 
deportations. The purpose of this transformation was to dupe a visiting inquiry 
from the International Committee of the Red Cross into believing that the ghetto 
was being run to an acceptable standard. Having successfully carried out the 
deception, the Nazi authorities ordered Kurt Gerron, a Jewish actor who was also 
a prisoner at Terezin, to make a propaganda film, sometimes known as ‘The 
Führer gives a village to the Jews.’ In Gerron’s footage, the starved and diseased 
settlement, where thousands had already died, was presented as a happy camp, 
complete with smiling and industrious workers. Together with his cast, Gerron 
was despatched to Auschwitz shortly after filming. 
 
In his book Summits (Allen Lane, 2007), David Reynolds remarks on the way 
Cold War theatricality shaped the conduct of post-war world leaders. No longer 
the ‘parley at the summit’ imagined by Churchill in 1950, or an elevated example 
of ‘diplomatic dialogue’ between several leaders, meetings between world 
leaders were turned into a confrontation between frozen opposites. The first 
postwar summit, held in Geneva in 1955, was a ‘carefully staged’ affair, used by 
both sides for propaganda purposes, with leaders reading prepared statements 
and addressing their remarks not to each other but to abstractly imagined 
audiences of their own chosing – be it public opinion in the West, or the Soviet 
satellite states in East Europe. 
 
This may be taken to confirm Tracy C. Davis’s contention in Stages of 
Emergency: Cold War Nuclear Civil Defence that ‘theatre did not dwindle in 
stature after the mid-20th century; it simply broadened its range of venues.’ Her 
own examples are drawn from the civil defence exercises with which the 
Canadian, British and American governments responded to the threat of nuclear 
attack. 
 
One day in 1956, a boy named Donald Hurt set to work with his father to 
construct a bomb shelter in his backyard in rural Missouri. Built to government 
specifications, it was reached via a tunnel extending from the basement of the 
family home, and Hurt’s parents slept in it every night for the next twenty years. 
Many contemplated a similar course of action, especially after Kennedy advised 
Americans to consider installing personal shelters at the time of the Berlin Crisis 
in 1961. Demand was such that Sears Roebuck were soon offering prefabricated 
versions made by the ‘Peace-O-Mind’ Shelter Company of Texas. 
 
In 1964, three British women stepped into the role of ‘civil defence volunteers’ 
and entered a model shelter next to the Guildhall in York. They spent 24 hours in 
their miserable hollow, listening to simulated regional broadcasts beamed in from 
a van outside. They slept for a few hours in a specially sandbagged ‘core’ area 
intended to protect them against fallout, cooked a meal on a primus stove and 
swallowed aspirins for their headaches. After a single day they were plainly 
demoralised. As the Times wrote of the widely reported exercise, ‘even that basic 
feminine impulse to make frequent cups of tea deserted them.’ 
 
By the 1970s, Americans in rural areas, which fell outside the scope of their 
government’s large-scale Crisis Relocation Plans, were being invited to create 
their own shelters along the lines recommended by the Civil Defense 
Preparedness Agency. In Oak Ridge, Tennessee, a couple with a teenage son 
used a pickaxe to dig a short narrow trench. They then drove their Ford Maverick 
sedan over it, filling the car with earth and closing the shelter with plastic 
sheeting and more mud piled up around the vehicle’s sides. The Hoffner family of 
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, spared their car, instead using mud piled on old 
doors to cover their experimental trench. The official suggestion was that it would 
be possible for a family or four to survive ten days crammed into such 
rudimentary accommodation. 
 
A suspension of disbelief was plainly necessary if British city dwellers were to 
accept the ‘cupboard under the stairs’ as a potential shelter against nuclear 
fallout, or if American school children were to feel safer crouching under their 
desks at the call of ‘Duck and Cover’. But Davis is at pains to establish that the 
preparatory exercises conducted in the name of Civil Defence were not really 
performances at all. She describes them as rehearsals, which gestured towards 
a catastrophic performance that never actually took place. In campaigns such as 
‘Alert America’ and ‘On Guard, Canada’ in 1951, the aim was to command 
widespread attention through ‘the most far-reaching public-education project of 
its kind’. 
 
Other exercises, concerned with maintaining ‘the continuity of government’ in the 
event of a nuclear strike, were altogether more ‘covert’. Indeed, Davis contends 
that in the early 1960s, the authorities ‘went underground’ and ran their own 
exercises in preparation for nuclear war. America’s ‘Operation Spade Fork’, 
which ended just before the beginning of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, 
involved six hundred civilians from 27 federal departments and agencies, and 
rehearsed the activities to be carried out before an attack. Rehearsals of this kind 
were often set in secret bunkers such as the 12 ‘Regional Seats of Government’ 
built in Britain in the 1950s: sunken caverns in which planners plotted wind 
direction and the spread of fallout on maps, while gazing at screens on which 
vast multitudes flickered and died. Richard Nixon’s chief of staff, H.R. Haldeman, 
records that his boss was much troubled by ‘the lightly tossed-about millions of 
deaths’ witnessed at one such exercise: so much so, Davis says, that he 
encouraged the Pentagon to devote more energy to finding ‘strategic 
alternatives’ to outright nuclear warfare. 
 
If, as Davis puts it, ‘Civil Defence became like a religion’ as the Cold War 
dragged on, this was partly because it appealed to traditional gender roles: ‘Male 
adherents could heroically battle an enemy, embody chauvinistic strength, and 
fight their personal battle against Communism and the infidel. Female adherents 
could offer comparable gender stereotyped behaviours, including maternal 
reassurance, caregiving and submission.’ It was also embraced by ‘survivalists’, 
who made a lifestyle out of what the sociologist Richard Mitchell, in Dancing at 
Armageddon: Survivalism and Chaos in Modern Times (Chicago, 2001), has 
called ‘the creative transcendence of calamitous cultural change’. 
 
Camping had been a recommended part of civil defence training since the 1950s, 
together with walking at least a mile a day and keeping your weight down. By the 
1970s enthusiasts were forming their own associations, buying Geiger counters 
and, being aware of the frantic traffic jams that would attend a coming 
emergency, practising how to leave town by canoe and other self-propelled 
means. American survivalists merged civil defence with the renewed tradition of 
the frontiersman in his remote shack: a lineage they shared with the Unabomber 
as well as John Brown. In the British countryside too, folk started eyeing the road 
out of the city with new kinds of alarm. Responsible for organising civil defence in 
their region, one local authority employee in Essex noted the importance of 
distinguishing their own people from the hordes of ‘zombies’ who could be 
expected to come staggering out of London in the event of an attack. 
 
In the US, Crisis Relocation Planning was discontinued by 1985. Resources were 
redirected to the Star Wars missile defence system and the familiar Civil Defence 
scenarios were ‘archived’. At the end of the Cold War, optimists dreamed that 
nukes would be beaten into ploughshares and perhaps also that ‘theatricality’ 
would confine itself once again to the playhouse. For a while, it might have 
seemed that America’s bunkers would start going the way of redundant anti-
nuclear facilities in Britain, which, so Davis suggests, ‘continue to come onto the 
market and present ideal secure accommodation for computing operations, air-
filtered premises for pneumo-restorative centres, damp caves for mushroom or 
marijuana growers, and unstormable hideouts for motorcycle gangs’. 
 
But the ‘war on terror’ has launched a whole new generation of ‘players, 
scenarios and rehearsals’, together with a new Department of Homeland Security 
tasked with reinstalling ‘preparedness’ in the routines of everyday life. Davis sees 
the new rehearsals as being of a part with the rise of the urban sports utility 
vehicle, the spectre of the ‘dirty’ bomb and the apprehension with which many 
Americans might greet any brown face boarding a plane. She argues that the 
legacies of civil defence live on in the way we imagine ‘enemies’, and in public 
consent to surveillance and security measures that would have seemed 
excessive only a few years ago but are tolerated now thanks to a ‘new orthodoxy 
of fear’, expressed as patriotism at home and ‘setting people free’ abroad. 
 
The Canadian and British publics may be rather less compliant than the 
American, as Davis suggests, yet ‘embodied rehearsals’ are now carried out in 
all three countries. ‘An up-to-date version of duck and cover is conducted 
moment by moment in airports,’ she writes, ‘while in the United States the 
rhetoric of risk leads additionally to fears that anyone photographing federal 
buildings ipso facto plans to sabotage them, that the press should not report 
openly on defence matters, and that scrutinising financial transactions, 
conducting data mining and demanding libraries’ lending records are duties that 
supersede concerns of racial, ethnic or religious bias.’ 
There is ample reason to be concerned about these developments. Yet we 
should resist any temptation to think that we are all now living in a Potemkinist 
set-world, like the Disneyesque ‘Seaview’ of Peter Weir’s film The Truman Show. 
As Davis shows, attempts to involve the public in ‘performed compliance’ with 
state policy have persistently backfired. Civil defence rehearsals were met with 
savage mockery, which isn’t surprising given, say, the British Home Office’s 
willingness to advise householders to prepare for nuclear attack by whitewashing 
their windows and removing flammable old newspapers from their attics. 
 
In Whole World on Fire (Cornell 2003), the Stanford historian Lynn Eden has 
shown that US war planners ‘systematically discounted’ the likelihood of nuclear 
firestorms in their post-strike scenarios, concentrating exclusively on blast 
damage instead, and that is only one example of the tactical blindnesses that 
supported civil defence rhetoric from the early 1950s onwards. Protesters were 
alert to these, and also brought their own theatrical devices to the show, 
including death masks and dead pigs dressed in military uniform. Davis shows 
that they managed to embarrass the authorities into modifying and sometimes 
discontinuing their plans for civil defence rehearsals. 
 
In the estimate of one American psychiatrist quoted by Davis, civil defence was a 
form of ‘psychological defence’ that enabled citizens and public officials to ‘deny 
the realities of nuclear war’ and ‘avoid the anxiety’ of thinking about the extinction 
it threatened. If it didn’t work, then that’s at least in part because the measures 
proposed were blatantly inadequate to the catastrophe imagined. Public 
scepticism about civil defence is modestly reassuring. It suggests that people can 
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